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Abstract— Aggregative games have many industrial applica-
tions, and computing an equilibrium in those games is challeng-
ing when the number of players is large. In the framework of
atomic aggregative games with coupling constraints, we show that
variational Nash equilibria of a large aggregative game can be
approximated by a Wardrop equilibrium of an auxiliary population
game of smaller dimension. Each population of this auxiliary game
corresponds to a group of atomic players of the initial large game.
This approach enables an efficient computation of an approxi-
mated equilibrium, as the variational inequality characterizing the
Wardrop equilibrium is of smaller dimension than the initial one.
This is illustrated on an example in the smart grid context.
Index Terms— Aggregative Game - Variational Nash Equi-
librium - Variational Inequalities - Population Game
I. INTRODUCTION
a) Motivation: Aggregative games [1] form a class of nonco-
operative games [2], finding practical applications—in particular for
the subclass of splittable congestion games [3]—in various fields
as traffic management [4], communications [5], [6] and electrical
systems [7], [8].
The notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) [9] has emerged as the central
solution concept in game theory. However, the computation of an NE
is considered a challenging problem: for instance, [10] showed that,
in finite two-players matricial games, computing a pure NE is PPAD-
complete, while [11] showed that computing an NE in splittable
congestion games with player-specific affine latency functions is also
PPAD-complete. In continuous games, NEs can be characterized as
solutions of Variational Inequalities (VI) [12], a characterization we
adopt through this work. The efficiency of NEs computation depends
on the dimension of these VIs, given by the number of players and
of constraints. In some applications (transport, energy, etc), one may
consider several thousands of heterogeneous agents. At this scale,
computing an NE can be intractable. In the case where the game
model involves coupling constraints between agents’ actions, the
concept generalizing the NE is simply referred to as generalized
Nash equilibria (GNE) [13], and can be even harder to compute. The
consideration of coupling constraints has emerged from applications:
for instance to model the capacity of roads and communication
channels or, in energy, to model the maximal variations of production
plants [14]. Estimating an NE as the probable outcome of the model
is of main importance for the operator of a system: for instance, in
order to control some physical or managerial parameters and optimize
the system (e.g. in bi-level programming [15]).
In this paper, we consider aggregative games with a finite but large
number of players. We propose a method to compute an approxima-
tion of variational Nash equilibria (VNEs) [13], a subset of GNEs in
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the presence of coupling constraints. The main idea of the proposed
method is to reduce the dimension of the VIs characterizing VNEs:
players are divided into groups with similar characteristics. Then,
each group is replaced by a homogeneous population of nonatomic
players. Last, we compute a variational Wardrop equilibrium (VWE)
[16] in the obtained approximating nonatomic population game. The
quality of the NE estimation depends on how well the characteristics
(action sets and cost functions) of each homogeneous population
approximate those of the atomic players it replaces.
b) Related works: The relation between NEs and WEs has been
studied in different contexts: [17] consider network congestion game
with each origin-destination pair having n players and show the
convergence of NEs to a WE when n goes to infinity. [18] generalizes
this result in the framework of composite games where nonatomic
players and atomic splittable players coexist.
A work particularly in line with the present paper is [19] where
the authors show, using a variational inequalities approach, that the
distance between a VNE and a VWE in aggregative games converges
to zero when the number of players tends to infinity. Their VWE
corresponds to an equilibrium of the game where each atomic player
is replaced by a population, as done in Sec. III-A of this paper. Their
quantitative results show that the self impact of each player on the
aggregate action is negligible when the number of players is large.
Our paper shows a different result: VNEs are approximated by a
VWE of a game with a reduced dimension. To this end, Sec. III-
A extends the results of [19] to the subdifferentiable case. In [20],
Jacquot and Wan show that, in congestion games with a continuum
of heterogeneous players, the VWE can be approximated by a VNE
of an approximating game with a finite number of players. In [21],
those results are extended to aggregative games with nonsmooth cost
functions. The approach developed in the present paper is actually
the inverse of the one taken in [20] and [21]: here, the VWE in the
auxiliary game serves as an approximation of a VNE of the original
large game.
c) Main contributions:
• we define an approximating population game (Sec. III-B), with
smaller dimension but close enough to the original large game—
quantified through the Hausdorff distance between action sets and
between subgradients of players’ objective functions;
• we show that a particular VWE of the approximating reduced-
dimension population game is close to any VNE of the original game
with or without coupling constraints, and we provide an explicit
expression of this approximation error (Thm. 2);
• we show that VNEs are close to VWEs in large aggregative
games Thm. 1, extending [19, Thm. 1] to subdifferentiable cost
functions and general aggregatively monotone games;
• we provide a numerical illustration of our results (Sec. IV)
based on a practical application: the decentralized charging of electric
vehicles through a demand response mechanism [22]. This exam-
ple illustrates the nondifferentiable case through piece-wise linear
functions (“block rates tariffs”) and coupling constraints (capaci-
ties and limited variations). This example shows that the proposed
method is implementable and reduces the time needed to compute an
equilibrium by computing its approximation (six times faster for an
approximation with a normalized distance to the actual equilibrium
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2of less than 2%).
d) Structure: The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: Sec. II specifies the framework of aggregative games with
coupling constraints, and recalls the notions of variational equilibria
and monotonicity for VIs, as well as several results on the existence
and uniqueness of equilibria. Sec. III formulates the main results:
Sec. III-A shows that a VWE approximates VNEs in large games
and then, Sec. III-B formulates the approximating population game
with the approximation measures, and gives an upper bound on the
distance between the VWE profile of the approximating game to an
original VNE profile. Sec. IV presents a numerical illustration in the
context of electricity demand response.
II. AGGREGATIVE GAMES WITH COUPLING
CONSTRAINTS
A. Model and equilibria
We consider the model of atomic aggregative games: the cost
function of each player depends only on her own action and on
the aggregate action. The term atomic is opposed to the nonatomic
model where players are infinitesimal and have a negligible weight
[2]. As the aggregate action of players is considered in this model,
all players have their feasible action sets lying in the same space RT
with T ∈ N∗ fixed. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 1: An atomic aggregative game with coupling con-
straints G(A) is defined by a finite set of players N def=
{1, . . . , n, . . . , N} and for each player n ∈ N :
• a set of feasible actions Xn ⊂ RT , with a fixed T ∈ N∗;
• an individual cost function fn : Xn ×A → R;
• a setA ⊂ RT defining the aggregative coupling constraint: X¯ ∈ A
where X¯ def= 1N
∑
n xn denotes the average action for individual
actions of players (xn)n∈N .
The game is written as the tuple G(A) def= (N ,X , (fn)n,A).
We denote by X def= X1×· · ·×XN the product set of action profiles,
and the set of feasible average profiles by:
X def= {X¯ ∈ RT : ∀n ∈ N , ∃xn ∈ Xn s.t. 1N
∑
n∈N xn = X¯}.
Last, we denote the set of feasible action profiles satisfying the
coupling constraint A by:
X (A) def= {x ∈ X : 1N
∑
n∈N xn ∈ X ∩ A} .
A particular class of aggregative games with many applications is
given by splittable congestion games [3]:
Definition 2: A splittable congestion game is defined by a set of
resources T , each resource t having a cost function ct ∈ RR+ , and
a set of player N with actions set (Xn)n∈N ⊂ (RT+)N , and with
individual utility function un ∈ RXn . The cost function fn : Xn ×
X → R of player n ∈ N is defined as:
∀xn, Y¯ ∈Xn×X , fn(xn, Y¯ ) def=
∑
t∈T
xn,tct(Y¯t)− un(xn). (1)
As the action of n appears both in the first and second argument
(through X¯) of her cost function fn, we consider for each n ∈ N ,
the modified cost function:
fˆn(xn, Y¯−n)
def
= fn(xn, Y¯−n+ 1N xn)
for xn∈Xn and Y¯−n∈X−n def= { 1N
∑
m6=n xm : xm∈Xm, ∀m}.
In this paper, we adopt the following standard assumptions:
Assumption 1:
i) for each player n ∈ N , the set Xn is a convex and compact
subset of RT with nonempty relative interior;
ii) for each n ∈ N , the cost function fn and modified cost function
fˆn are convex in the first variable;
iii) for each n ∈ N , the cost function xn, X¯ 7→ fn(xn, X¯) is
Lipschitz continuous in X¯ , with Lipschitz constant L2 independent
of n and xn;
iv) A is a convex closed set of RT , and X ∩A is not empty.
Let us consider the subgradient correspondences Hˆ : X ⇒ RNT
and H : X ⇒ RNT , defined for any x ∈ X as:
Hˆ(x)
def
= {(hn)n∈N ∈RNT : hn∈∂1fˆn(xn, X¯−n), ∀n ∈ N}
=
∏
n∈N ∂1fˆn(xn, X¯−n) ;
H(x)
def
= {(hn)n∈N ∈ RNT : hn ∈ ∂1fn(xn, X¯), ∀n ∈ N}
=
∏
n∈N ∂1fn(xn, X¯) ,
where ∂1 denotes the partial differential w.r.t. the first variable of the
function. The interpretation of Hˆ(x) is clear: hn is a subgradient of
player n’s utility function fˆn w.r.t. her action xn. Let us leave the
interpretation of H(x) until Def. 4. For the moment, let us establish
a relation between Hˆ and H:
Lemma 1: For each x ∈ X , h ∈ Hˆ(x) if and only if
there exists g1 ∈
∏
n∈N ∂1fn(xn, X¯) = H(x) and g2 ∈∏
n∈N ∂2fn(xn, X¯) such that h = g1 +
1
N g2.
Proof: The proof can be obtained from [23, Prop. 16.6 and
16.7]. Details are omitted for brevity.
In the presence of coupling constraints, the notion of Nash equilib-
rium (NE) [9] is replaced by the one of Generalized Nash Equilibrium
(GNE). A profile x ∈ X (A) is a GNE if, for each player n:
fˆn(xn, X¯−n)≤ fˆn(yn, X¯−n), ∀yn s.t. (yn/N+X¯−n)∈ X ∩A.
For atomic games, Variational Nash Equilibria (VNE) [13], [24] form
a special class of GNEs with symmetric properties: in some sense,
the burden of constraint X¯ ∈ A is shared symmetrically by players
[13]. VNEs, in the subdifferentiable case, are characterized as the
solution of a generalized VI (GVI) (2) stated below.
Definition 3 (Variational Nash Equilibrium (VNE), [13]): A
VNE is a solution xˆ ∈ X (A) to the following GVI problem:
∃g ∈ Hˆ(xˆ) s.t. 〈g,x− xˆ〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X (A). (2)
In particular, if X ⊂ A, a VNE is an NE. We refer to [25] for
further discussions on VNE and VI characterization. In this paper, we
adopt the notion of VNE as the equilibrium concept in the presence
of aggregate constraints.
As the first step of approximation, we define a nonatomic aggrega-
tive game G(A)′ associated to G(A), where each player n is replaced
by a continuum of identical nonatomic players. The set of nonatomic
players is represented by the interval [0, 1]. Each player in population
n has action set Xn and cost function fn. In nonatomic games, the
concept of VNE is replaced by the concept of variational Wardrop
equilibrium (VWE). We refer to [21] for the formal definition of a
VWE and further discussions. In general, a VWE is characterized by
an infinite dimensional VI. Here, we only consider symmetric VWE,
characterized by a VI of finite dimension as defined below:
Definition 4: A symmetric variational Wardrop equilibrium
(SVWE) of G(A)′ is a solution x∗ ∈ X (A) to the GVI:
∃g ∈ H(x∗) s.t. 〈g,x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X (A) . (3)
where, for each n ∈ N , x∗n is the common action adopted by all
nonatomic players in population n.
In addition to the population game interpretation, an SVWE can
be interpreted as an equilibrium concept in the initial game, where
the contribution of each atomic player on the aggregate action X
is negligible [19]. However, in this interpretation, an SVWE is not
3stable, as the individual SVWE profile x∗n of a player n does not
necessarily minimize her cost function fˆn(., X¯−n).
The existence of an SVWE in the population game G(A)′, with
players identical in the same population, is given in Prop. 1.
Proposition 1 (Existence of equilibria): Under Asm. 1, G(A)
(resp. G(A)′) admits a VNE (resp. SVWE).
Proof: : From [26, Proposition 8.7], we obtain that Hˆ and
H are nonempty, convex, compact valued, upper hemicontinuous
correspondences. Then [27, Corollary 3.1] shows that the GVI
problems (2) and (3) both admit a solution on the finite dimensional
convex compact X (A).
Before discussing the uniqueness of equilibria, let us recall some
relevant definition of monotonicity for correspondences:
Definition 5: A correspondence Γ : X ⇒ RNT is said:
i) monotone if for all x,y ∈ X ,g ∈ Γ(x),h ∈ Γ(y):∑
n∈N 〈gn − hn,xn − yn〉 ≥ 0 ;
ii) strictly monotone if the equality holds iff x = y;
iii) aggregatively strictly monotone if equality holds iff
∑
n xn =∑
n yn;
iv) α-strongly monotone if α > 0 and, for all x,y ∈ X :∑
n〈gn − hn,xn − yn〉≥α‖x− y‖2, ∀g∈Γ(x),h∈Γ(y) ;
v) β-aggregatively strongly monotone on X if β > 0 and, for all
x,y ∈ X with X¯ = 1N
∑
n xn, Y¯ =
1
N
∑
n yn:∑
n〈gn − hn,xn − yn〉≥Nβ‖X¯ − Y¯ ‖2, ∀g∈Γ(x),h∈Γ(y).
If T = 1, “monotone” corresponds to “increasing”. Besides,
(aggregatively) strict monotonicity implies monotonicity, while strong
(resp. aggregatively strong) monotonicity implies strict (resp. ag-
gregatively strict) monotonicity.
Prop. 2 recalls some results on the uniqueness of VNE and SVWE,
according to the monotonicity of Hˆ and H:
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness of equilibria): Under Asm. 1:
i) if Hˆ (resp. H) is strictly monotone, then G(A) (resp. G(A)′) has
a unique VNE (resp. SVWE);
ii) if Hˆ (resp. H) is aggregatively strictly monotone, then all VNE
(resp. SVWE) of G(A) (resp. G(A)′) have the same aggregate profile.
Proof: The proof can be adapted from [12, Chapter 2].
As opposed to the monotonicity of H which happens for instance
in congestion games with convex cost of resources [19, Lemma 3],
Hˆ is rarely monotone (except in some particular cases, e.g. with c
linear [3], [28]). In view of Prop. 2, the absence of monotonicity of
Hˆ can result in multiple VNEs [29]. However, the next section shows
that, with a large number of players, those VNEs are close to each
other, and are well approximated by an SVWE.
III. APPROXIMATING VNES OF A LARGE GAME
A. Considering SVWE instead of VNE
Let us denote by X0 ⊂ RT the convex closed hull of
⋃
n∈N Xn,
and consider the radius:
R
def
= max
x∈X0
‖x‖ .
Thm. 1 gives the first step of approximation of VNEs, by bounding
the distance between a VNE and an SVWE.
Theorem 1 (SVWE close to VNE): Under Asm. 1, let x∈X (A)
be a VNE of G(A) and x∗ ∈ X (A) an SVWE of G(A)′:
i) if H is α-strongly monotone, then x∗ is unique and:
‖x− x∗‖ ≤ L2
α
1√
N
, with α def= min
n∈N
αn, besides (4)
1
N
∑
n
‖xn − x∗n‖ ≤ L2
αN
and ‖X¯ − X¯∗‖ ≤ L2
αN
, (5)
where L2 is the Lipschitz constant defined in Asm. 1;
ii) if H is β-aggr. str. monotone, then X∗ is unique and:
‖X¯ − X¯∗‖ ≤
√
2RL2
βN , with β
def
= min
t∈T
βt . (6)
Proof: The proof for i) can be adapted from [19, Th. 1.2)] to
the subdifferential case, by relying on Lemma 1. The proof for ii)
generalizes [19, Th. 1.3] for aggr. monotone games.
While VNEs are not unique in general (see Prop. 2), by applying
the triangle inequality to the results of Thm. 1 we observe that all
VNEs are close to each other when N is large.
Thm. 1 shows that an (average) SVWE approximates an (average)
VNE of G(A) when the number of players is large, but this does
not reduce the dimension of the GVI to resolve, as the GVI char-
acterizing the VNE and those characterizing SVWE have the same
dimension. For this reason, the second step of approximation consists
in regrouping the similar populations.
B. Classification of populations
In this subsection, we shall regroup the populations of the game
G(A)′ having similar strategy sets Xn and utility subgradients
∂(−un), into larger populations, endow them with a common strat-
egy set and a common utility function, so that the SVWE of this new
population game approximates the SVWE of G(A)′. The similarity
between two sets X and Y is measured through the Hausdorff
distance:
dH(X ,Y) def= max
(
max
x∈X
d(x,Y), max
y∈Y
d(y,X )) .
Let us define the compact setM def= X0+B0(δ) , where B0(δ) is the
ball centered at 0 and of radius δ, and δ ≥ maxn,m∈N dH(Xn,Xm).
W.l.o.g, we assume that for each n ∈ N , fn can be extended
to a neighborhood of M2, and is bounded on M2. We make the
additional assumption:
Assumption 2: For each n ∈ N and each X¯ ∈ X , fn(·, X¯) is
Lipschitz continuous with constant L1n, and L1
def
= maxn L1n<∞.
At the SVWE of the game with reduced dimension, all the
nonatomic players in the same population play the same action, by
definition of an SVWE. Therefore, in order for this new SVWE to
well approximate the SVWE in G(A)′, a condition is that similar
populations in G(A)′ do play similar actions at the SVWE of G(A)′:
this is obtained easily in the case without coupling constraint, as
shown in Prop. 3.
Proposition 3: Under Asm. 1, let x∗ ∈ X be an SVWE of G′(A)
with A = RT (no coupling constraint). For populations n,m ∈ N ,
if fn(., X¯∗) is αn-strongly convex, dH(Xn,Xm) ≤ δ, and if:
sup
gm∈∂1fm(x∗m,X¯∗)
d(gm, ∂1fn(x
∗
m, X¯
∗))) ≤ d
then:
∥∥x∗n − x∗m∥∥2 ≤ 1αn ((L1n + L1m)d+ 2δR).
Proof: The proof is obtained using strong convexity, the
definition of d, and Lipschitz convexity, following the same scheme
as for Thm. 2
In the case with coupling constraints, the proof for a similar result
is more complicated, and we leave it to Cor. 1.
Let us now present the regrouping procedure. Denote by G˜I(A)
an auxiliary game, with a set I of p populations. Each population
i ∈ I corresponds to a subset Ni of populations in the game G(A)′,
such that
⋃
i∈I Ni = N and for any i, j ∈ I,Ni ∩ Nj = ∅, i.e
(Ni)i∈I forms a partition of N . Denote pi = |Ni| the number
of original populations now included in i. By abuse of notations,
let i also denote the interval [0, pi], so that each nonatomic player
in population i is represented by a point θ ∈ [0, pi]. The common
action set of each nonatomic player in i is a compact convex subset
4of RT , denoted by Xi. Each player θ in each population i playing
action xθ , let
X¯
def
= 1N
∑
i∈I
∫
θ∈i
xθ dθ
denotes the aggregate action profile. The set of aggregate action-
profile is a subset of RT given as:
XI def= { 1N
∑
i∈I
∫
θ∈i xθ dθ : xθ ∈ Xi, ∀θ ∈ i, ∀i ∈ I} .
All players θ in population i ∈ I have a similar cost function denoted
by xθ, X¯ 7→ fi(xθ, X¯), convex w.r.t. xθ .
We are only interested in symmetric action profiles, where all the
nonatomic players in each population i play the same action. Denote
the set of symmetric action profiles by XI = ∏i∈I Xi. Considering
the coupling constraint X ∈ A, let:
XI(A) def= {x ∈ XI : X¯ = 1N
∑
i∈I pixi ∈ A} .
We introduce two indicators to quantify the clustering of G˜I :
• δ = maxi∈I δi, where
δi
def
= maxn∈Ni dH (Xn,Xi) , (7)
• d = maxi∈I di, where
di
def
= max
n∈Ni
sup
xi∈Xi,X¯∈M
dH
(
∂1fi(xi, X¯), ∂1fn(xi, X¯)
)
. (8)
The quantity δi measures the heterogeneity in strategy sets of
populations within the groupNi, while di measures the heterogeneity
in the subgradients in the group Ni.
Since the auxiliary game G˜I is to be used to compute an approxi-
mation of a VNE of G, the indicators δi and di should be minimized
when defining G˜I . Thus, we assume that (Xi)i and (ui)i are chosen
such that the following holds:
Assumption 3: For each i ∈ I, we have:
i) Xi is in X0, the convex hull of
⋃
n∈Ni Xn, so that
maxx∈Xi ‖x‖ ≤ R. Moreover, for each n ∈ Ni, aff Xn ⊂ aff Xi,
where aff S denotes the affine hull of S;
ii) similarly, fi is chosen such that ∂1fi(xi, X¯) is contained in the
convex hull of
⋃
n∈Ni ∂1fn(xi, X¯) for all x ∈ Xi and X¯ ∈ M,
so that supgi∈∂1fi(xi,X¯) ‖gi‖ ≤ maxn∈Ni
L1n ≤ L1.
An interesting case appears when N can be divided into homoge-
neous populations, as in Ex. 1 below:
Example 1: The player setN can be divided into a small number p
of subsets (Ni)1≤i≤p, with homogeneous players inside each subset
Ni (i.e., for each i and n,m ∈ Ni, Xn = Xm and fn = fm). In
that case, consider an auxiliary game G˜I with i populations and, for
each i ∈ I and n ∈ Ni, Xi def= Xn and fi def= fn. Then, δ = d = 0.
In order to approximate the SVWE of G(A)′ by the SVWE of
an auxiliary game G˜I , let us first state the following result on the
geometry of the action sets for technical use.
Lemma 2: Under Asm. 1, there exists a strictly positive constant
ρ and an action profile z ∈ X (A) such that, d(zn, rbd Xn) ≥ ρ for
all n ∈ N , where rbd stands for the relative boundary.
Proof: See Appendix I.
Given a symmetric action profile xI ∈ XI(A) in the auxiliary
game G˜I(A), we can define a corresponding symmetric action profile
of G(A)′ such that all the nonatomic players in the populations
regrouped in Ni play the same action xIi (it is allowed that xIi be
not in Xn). Formally, we define the map ψ : RpT → RNT :
∀xI∈RpT , ψ(xI)=(xn)n∈N where xn=xIi , ∀n ∈ Ni .
Conversely, for a symmetric action profile x in G(A)′, we define a
corresponding symmetric action profile in the auxiliary game G˜I(A)
by the following map ψ : RNT → RpT :
∀x∈RNT , ψ(x)=(xIi )i∈I where xIi = 1pi
∑
n∈Ni xn.
Thm. 2 below is the main result of this subsection. It gives an upper
bound on the distance between the SVWE of the population game
G(A)′—of same dimension as the original atomic game G(A)—and
the SVWE of an auxiliary game G˜I(A) with reduced dimension.
Theorem 2 (SVWE of G˜I(A) is close to SVWE of G(A)′):
Under Asms. 1 and 3, in an auxiliary game G˜I(A), δ and d are
defined by (7) and (8), with δ < ρ2 . Let x be an SVWE of G˜I(A),
and x∗ an SVWE of G(A)′. Then:
i) if H is α-strongly monotone, then x and x∗ are unique and
‖ψ(x)− x∗‖ ≤
√
N
K(δ,d)
α , besides (9)
1
N
∑
n
‖ψn(x)−x∗n‖ ≤
√
K(δ,d)
α and
∥∥X¯−X¯∗∥∥ ≤√K(δ,d)α ;
ii) if H is β-aggr. str. monotone, then X¯ , X¯∗ are unique and∥∥X¯ − X¯∗∥∥ ≤√K(δ,d)β , (10)
where K(δ, d) −→
δ,d→0
0 is a quantity defined as:
K(δ, d)
def
= 2R
(
3L1ρ δ + d
)
. (11)
Proof: Let us start by two technical lemmas, for which the
proofs are given in Appendix II.
Lemma 3:
i) For each i ∈ I and x ∈ Xi, if d(x, rbd Xi) > δi, then x ∈ Xn
for each n ∈ Ni.
ii) For each i ∈ I, n ∈ Ni and x ∈ Xn, if d(x, rbd Xn) > δi,
then x ∈ Xi.
Lemma 4: Under Asm. 1, if δ < ρ2 , then:
i) for each x ∈ XI(A), there is w ∈ X (A) such that ‖wn −
ψn(x)‖ ≤ 4R δρ for each n ∈ N ;
ii) for each x ∈ X (A), there is w ∈ XI(A) such that ‖wi −
ψi(x)‖ ≤ 2Rpi δρ for each n ∈ I.
Let w ∈ X (A) be s.t. ∀n ∈ N , ‖wn − ψn(x)‖ ≤ 4Rδ/ρ (cf.
Lemma 4). Since x∗ (resp x) is an SVWE of G(A)′ (resp. G˜(A)),
there exists g(x∗) ∈ H(x∗) (resp. (hi(x))i∈I∈∏i ∂1fi(xi, X¯)).∑
n〈g(x∗), x∗n −wn〉 ≤ 0 and
∑
ipi〈hi(x),xi − yi〉 ≤ 0.
for all y ∈ XI(A). Moreover, for each i and n ∈ Ni, by definition
of dn, let rn(x) ∈ ∂1fn(xi, X¯) s.t. ‖rn(x)−hi(x)‖ ≤ dn. Then,
〈g(x∗)− r(x),x∗ − ψ(x)〉 equals to:
〈g(x∗),x∗ −w〉+ 〈g(x∗),w − ψ(x)〉+ 〈r(x), ψ(x)− x∗〉.
The first term is nonpositive because x∗ is SVWE. By definition of
w, the second term is bounded by L1N4Rδ/ρ. Let us decompose the
third term, using a y ∈ XI(A) s.t. ∀i, ‖yi−ψi(x∗)‖I ≤ 2Rpiδ/ρ
(cf. Lemma 4), into:
〈r(x)−h(x), ψ(x)−x∗〉+〈h(x), ψ(x)−y〉+〈h(x),y−x∗〉.
The second term is nonpositive because x is an SVWE of G˜(A). The
first term is bounded by 2NRd. The third and last term is bounded
by L12RNδ/ρ.
We conclude to obtain the bounds stated above from the definition
of H being α-strongly monotone (resp. β-aggr. strongly monotone).
5Remark 1: The bound (9) given on the individual profiles diverges
with the number of players N . This is a consequence of the fact that
individual errors, ‖xn − x∗i ‖ for each n within a population Ni,
may accumulate, and this accumulation is captured by the Euclidean
norm, as ‖1N‖ =
√
N .
We have pointed out that the approximation error depends on how
the populations are clustered according to I, and is related to the
heterogeneity of players in N rather than their number. In particular,
in the case of Ex. 1, Thm. 2 states that the (aggregate) SVWE of the
auxiliary game G˜I(A) is exactly equal to the (aggregate) SVWE of
the large game G(A)′.
A corollary of Thm. 2-i) is that two populations in G(A)′ with
similar characteristics have similar behavior at an SVWE, which
extends Prop. 3 in the presence of coupling constraints.
Corollary 1: Let x∗ ∈ X be an SVWE of game G(A)′. Under
Asm. 1, for two populations n and m in N , if dH(Xn,Xm) ≤ δ,
supx∈M/p dH(∂(−um)(x), ∂(−un)(x)) ≤ d, and un (resp. um)
is αn- (resp. αm-)strongly concave, then
‖x∗n − x∗m‖ ≤
(
1√
αn
+ 1√
αm
)
K (δ, d)1/2 .
C. Combining the two steps to approximate a VNE of G(A)
The following theorem is the main result of the paper, which
is immediately obtained as the combination of the two steps of
approximation given in Thm. 1 and in Thm. 2 in the computation
of a VNE of the original game G(A).
Corollary 2 (SVWE of G˜I(A) is close to VNEs of G(A)): Under
Asms. 1 and 3, in an auxiliary game G˜I(A), δ and d are defined
by Eqs. (7) and (8), with δ < ρ2 . Let x
∗ be an SVWE of
G˜I(A), x ∈ X (A) be a VNE of G(A), X¯∗ = 1N
∑
i∈I pix
∗
i ,
X¯ = 1N
∑
n∈N xn, and K(δ, d) the constant given by (11).
i) if H is α-strongly monotone, then x∗ is unique and
‖ψ(x∗)− x‖ ≤ L2α
1√
N
+
√
N
K(δ,d)
α ,
1
N
∑
n
‖ψn(x∗)− xn‖ ≤ L2αN +
√
K(δ,d)
α
and
∥∥X¯ − X¯∗∥∥ ≤ L2αN +
√
K(δ,d)
α ;
ii) if H is β-aggr. str. monotone, then X¯∗is unique, and∥∥X¯ − X¯∗∥∥ ≤ R√ 2TCNβ +
√
K(δ,d)
β .
Given the large game G(A) and a certain p ∈ N∗, Cor. 2 suggests
that we should find the auxiliary game G˜I with I = {1, . . . , p} that
minimizes K(δ, d) in order to have the best possible approximation
of the equilibria. This would correspond to a “clustering problem”
given as follows:
min
(Ni)i∈Pp(N )
min
(Xi)i
min
(ui)i
K(δ, d), (12)
where Pp(N ) denotes the set of all partitions of N of cardinal p,
while (Xi)i and (ui)i are chosen according to Asm. 3.
The value of the optimal solutions of problem (12), and thus of the
quality of the approximation in Cor. 2, depends on the homogeneity
of the N players in N in terms of action sets and utility functions.
The “ideal” case is given in Ex. 1 where N is composed of a small
number p of homogeneous populations and thus K(δ, d) = 0.
Solving (12) is a hard problem in itself: it generalizes the k-means
clustering problem [30] (with k = p and considering a function of
Hausdorff distances), which is NP-hard [31]. In Sec. IV, we illustrate
how we use directly the k-means algorithm to compute efficiently an
approximate solution (Ni,Xi, ui)i∈I of (12) in the parametric case.
Finally, the number p in the definition of the auxiliary game should
be chosen a priori as a trade-off between the minimization of K(δ, d)
and a sufficient minimization of the dimension. Indeed, with I = N ,
Xn = Xi and ui = un, we get d = δ = 0. However, the aim
of Cor. 2 is to find an auxiliary game G˜I with p  N so that
the dimension of the GVIs characterizing the equilibria (and thus
the time needed to compute their solutions) is significantly reduced,
while ensuring a relatively small error, measured by d and δ.
IV. APPLICATION TO DEMAND RESPONSE AND
ELECTRICITY FLEXIBILITIES
Demand response (DR) [32] refers to the techniques to optimize
the electric consumption of distributed consumers [8]. The increasing
number of electric vehicles (EV) offers a new source of flexibility
in the optimization of the production and demand. To deal with
privacy and distributed decisions and information issues, many works
consider game theoretical approaches (considering consumers as
players) for the management of consumption flexibilities [33]. Let
us consider the charging of EVs on a set of 24-hour time-periods
T def= {1, . . . , T}, with T = 24, indexing the hours from 10 PM to
9PM the day after (to include night time periods).
a) Price functions: block rates energy prices: The operator
imposes electricity prices on each time-period, given as inclining
block-rates tariffs [34], i.e. a piece-wise affine function c(·) which
depends on the aggregate demand Xt =
∑
n xn,t, where xn,t is the
power used by consumer n at time period t (one can easily transform
it to a function of the average action Xt by scaling coefficients):
c(X) = 1 + 0.1X if X ≤ 500
c(X) = −49 + 0.2X if 500 ≤ X ≤ 1000
c(X) = −349 + 0.5X if 1000 ≤ X .
(13)
This function c is continuous and convex. Prices are transmitted by
the operator to each consumer (EV owner) n who minimizes, with
respect to xn, a cost function of the congestion form (1) with an
energy cost determined by (13) and a utility function un defined
below. An equilibrium gives a stable situation where each consumer
minimizes her cost and has no interest to deviate from her current
profile.
b) Consumers’ constraints and parameters: We consider a set
of N = 2000 consumers who have demand constraints of the form:
Xndef= {xn ∈ RT+ :
∑
t xn,t=En and xn,t ≤ xn,t ≤ xn,t} (14)
where En is the total energy needed by n, and xn,t, xn,t (physical)
bounds on the power allowed at time t. The utility functions have the
form un(xn)
def
= −ωn ‖xn − yn‖2, with yn a preferred charging
profile. Simulation parameters are chosen as follows:
• En is drawn uniformly between 1 and 30 kWh, which corre-
sponds to a typical charge of a residential EV.
• xn,xn: First, we generate, in two steps, a continual set of
charging time-periods Tn = {hn − τn2 , . . . , hn + τn2 };
– the duration τn is uniformly drawn from {4, . . . , T};
– hn is then uniformly drawn from {1 + τn2 , . . . , T − τn2 }.
Next, for t /∈ Tn, let xn,t = xn,t = 0 and, for t ∈ Tn, xn,t (resp.
xn,t) is drawn uniformly from [0, Enτn ] (resp. [
En
τn
, En]).
• ωn is drawn uniformly from [1, 10].
• yn,t is taken equal to xn,t on the first time periods of Tn (first
available time periods) until reaching En (consumption profile “plug
and charge”).
We consider the following coupling constraints:
−50 ≤ XT −X1 ≤ 50 (15)
Xt ≤ 1400, ∀t ∈ T (16)
6Constraint (15) imposes that the demand XT at the end of the
time horizon is close to the first aggregate X1, so that the profiles
computed for the finite time set T can be applied on a day-to-day,
periodical basis. Constraint (16) is a capacity constraint, (e.g. induced
by production capacities).
c) Computing populations with k-means: To apply the clus-
tering procedure of Sec. III-B, we use the k-means algorithm [30],
where “k”= p is the number of populations (groups) to replace the
large set of N players. For each player n, we define her parametric
description vector:
vn
def
= [ωn,yn, En,xn,xn] ∈ R3T+2 . (17)
The k-means algorithm finds a partition (Si)1≤i≤p of N into p
clusters, approximately solving the combinatorial problem:
min
S1,...,Sp
∑
1≤i≤p
∑
v∈Si
∥∥ESi(v)− v∥∥2= minS1,...,Sp ∑
1≤i≤p
|Si|Var(Si),
where ESi(v) =
1
|Si|
∑
n∈Si vn denotes the average value of v over
the set Si, taken to define wi, yi, Ei, xi and xi.
The simulations are run with different population numbers, with
p N chosen among {5, 10, 20, 50, 100}.
The k-means algorithm provides an efficient method to obtain
an approximate solution of (12): the solution obtained can be sub-
optimal in terms of K(δ, d), as the algorithm minimizes the squared
distance of the average vector of parameters in Si to the vectors of
parameters of the points in Si. Finding efficient methods to address
the problem (12) is an avenue for further research.
d) Computation methods: We compute a VNE (Def. 3) with the
original set of N players and the approximating SVWE (Def. 4) as
solutions of the associated GVI (2).
We employ the iterative projection method exposed in [19, Algo.
2], adapted to our subdifferentiable case by replacing the fixed
step τ used in with a variable step τ (k) = 1/k, in the spirit of
subgradient algorithms [35], [36]. The algorithm stops when the
Euclidean distance between two iterates is smaller than 10−3. We
refer to [19] for more details on the algorithm.
e) A trade-off between precision and computation time: Simu-
lations were run using Python on a single core Intel Xeon @3.4Ghz
and 16GB of RAM. In this simple example, the computation of
the actual VNE xˆ (and aggregate profile Xˆ) of the original game
with N = 2000 players is still possible, and is used to measure the
precision of our approximations.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: (a) Relative error to VNE ; (b) SVWE CPU Time.
Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b show the two main metrics to consider to
choose a relevant number of populations p: the precision of the
SVWE approximating the equilibrium (measured by the relative
distance of the aggregate SVWE profile X∗ to the aggregate VNE
profile Xˆ computed along,
∥∥∥X∗ − Xˆ∥∥∥ / ‖X∗‖), and the CPU time
needed to compute the SVWE. The distance between the aggregate
equilibrium profile and its estimation decreases with N at a sublinear
rate Fig. 1a. This is explained in light of Thm. 2 and in addition with
the following remarks:
• the Hausdorff distance between parameterized polyhedra is Lip-
schitz continuous w.r.t their parameter vectors (see [37]);
• similarly, as subgradients of utility functions
are reduced to a point, one has, for all n, di =
maxn∈Ni maxx∈M 2 ‖ωi(x− yi)− ωn(x− yn)‖
= O (maxn∈Ni |ωi − ωn|+ ‖yi − yn‖) .
Fig. 1b shows the CPU time needed to compute the SVWE with our
stopping criterion. The CPU time evolves linearly with the number
of populations p, which is explained by the distributed structure of
the algorithm, requiring a number of iterations proportional to p. The
computation of a solution of the clustering problem with the k-means
algorithm is negligible (less than ten seconds for each value of p).
Computing the VNE of the original game with the same config-
uration and stopping criterion took 3 hours and 26 minutes were
needed, more than six times longer than to compute the SVWE with
one hundred populations.
Last, the error between the aggregate demand profile at equilibrium
and its approximation (Fig. 1a) is between 2% and 5%, which remains
significant. However, as pointed out in Sec. III, the quality of the
approximation depends on the heterogeneity of the set of players N :
as the parameters are drawn uniformly in this experiment, the set of
players N presents a large variance, and provides us with a “worst”
case (as opposed to Ex. 1 which offers an optimal situation).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that equilibria in large splittable aggregative
games can be approximated with a Wardrop equilibrium of an
auxiliary population game of smaller dimension. Our results give
explicit bounds on the distance of this approximating equilibrium to
the equilibria of the original large game. These theoretical results
can be used in practice to solve, by an iterative method, complex
nonconvex bilevel programs where the lower level is the equilibrium
of a large aggregative game, for instance, to optimize tariffs or tolls
for the operator of a network. The analysis of such a procedure will
constitute an interesting extension of this work. Besides, this study
highlighted the need for efficient algorithms for solving clustering
problems of type (12), as well as distributed algorithms for solving
GVI problems without a strong monotonicity assumption [19], [35].
Those algorithmic considerations are also interesting avenues for
further research.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: EXISTENCE OF INTERIOR PROFILE
Let xˇ ∈ X be such that for all n:
d(xˇn, rbd Xn) = maxx∈Xn d(x, rbd Xn)
def
= ηn.
Denote ¯ˇX= 1N
∑
n xˇn and η=minn ηn > 0. Let y ∈ X (A) and
Y¯ = 1N
∑
n yn be s.t.:
d(Y¯ , rbd A) = maxX¯∈X∩A d(X¯, rbd A) .
Let us denote t = d(Y¯ , rbd A)/3R and let us define z = y− t(y−
xˇ) ∈ X and Z¯ = 1N
∑
n zn. We obtain:
‖Y¯ − Z¯‖ = t‖Y¯ − ¯ˇX‖ ≤ t2R ≤ 23d(Y¯ , rbd A) ,
hence Z¯ ∈ X ∩ ri A, where ri means the relative interior. Besides,
for any n, zn = yn − t(yn − xˇn). Since d(xˇn, rbd Xn) ≥ η,
7yn ∈ Xn, and Xn is convex, we have:
d(zn, rbd Xn) ≥ ηt = η3Rd(Y¯ , rbd A) .
We can conclude by defining ρ def= η3Rd(Y¯ , rbd A).
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THE LEMMAS OF THM. 2
Proof: Lemma 3 i) Suppose x /∈ Xn. Let y def= PXn(x) 6= x.
As y ∈ aff Xn ⊂ aff Xi, then x − y ∈ aff Xi. Let z def= x +
δi
x−y
‖x−y‖ . Then, z ∈ Xi because ‖z − x‖ ≤ δi. By the convexity of
Xn and the definition of y, we have d(z,Xn) = d(x,Xn)+δi > δi,
contradicting the fact that δi ≥ dH(Xn,Xi). The proof of ii) is
symmetric.
Proof: [Proof of Lemma 4]
i) For x ∈ XI(A), define w ∈ X as follows: ∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ Ni,
let wn
def
= xi + t(zn − xi) where z is defined in Lemma 2, with
t
def
= 2δ/ρ < 1. On the one hand:
∀i ∈ I, ∀n ∈ Ni, d(zn, rbd Xi) ≥ ρ− δ
implies d(wn, rbd Xi) ≥ t(ρ− δ) > tρ/2 = δ ,
because each point in the ball with radius t(ρ − δ) centered at wn
is on the segment linking xi and some point in the ball with radius
ρ− δ centered at zn which is contained in Xn.
Thus, wn ∈ Xn ∀n ∈ Ni according to Lemma 3.i). On the other
hand, the linear mapping S : RIT 3 v 7→ 1N
∑
n∈N vn maps the
segment linking ψ(x) and z in X (A) to a segment linking X¯ =
1
N
∑
i pixi and Z¯ in the convex A. We get:
1
N
∑
n∈N wn = tZ¯ + (1− t)X¯ ∈ A
and thus w ∈ X (A). Finally, ‖wn − ψn(x)‖ = t‖zn − ψn(x)‖ ≤
t2R = 4R δρ .
ii) For x ∈ X (A), let y def= x+ t(z − x) with t def= δρ . Then, by
similar arguments as above, d(yn, rbd Xn) ≥ δ hence yn ∈ Xi and
ψ(y) ∈ XI . From the convexity of A:
1
N
∑
n yn = tZ¯ + (1− t)( 1N
∑
n xn) ∈ A .
Hence w def= ψ(y) ∈ XI(A). Finally, ‖wi − ψi(x)‖ =
t‖∑n∈pi(zn − xn)‖ ≤ 2Rpi δρ .
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